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Where Mercy, Love, and Pity dwell, 
There God is dwelling too. 
William Blake 
 
The importance of the concept of pity in Dostoevsky’s Christian faith has 
not been sufficiently addressed in Dostoevsky studies, although the term 
often appears on the list of Christian virtues—together with humility, 
Christian love, and redemptive suffering—that his protagonists must 
accept in order to be saved. I will argue that in Crime and Punishment 
Dostoevsky presents pity and/or compassion as the most important 
Christian virtue, one above the other Christian virtues and human 
emotions for which scientific and political theories have no place. He in 
effect posits pity as the essence of Christianity. Dostoevsky thus 
privileges an emotion with a rather problematic status, one that many 
influential thinkers of his day see as Christianity’s weakest point. 
Dostoevsky builds an argument against such detractors of pity as Kant 
and Nietzsche: he argues against Kantian distrust of pity and in fact 
preempts Nietzsche’s future claim that pity is the most harmful of all 
Christian virtues and his definition of Christianity as “active pity for all 
the failures and all the weak.”1 In Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky 
shows that Christianity is in essence active pity and in this lies its greatest 
strength.  
Pity or compassion is commonly understood as recognition of 
another’s suffering followed by an impulse to alleviate it. Scholars define 
compassion as a combination of cognitive, affective, and volitional 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann 
(New York: Viking Press, 1954), 570. 
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components: “In compassion, we see another’s distress (cognition), we 
feel moved by it (affectivity), and we actively seek to remedy it 
(volition).”2 When a person recognizes the feelings of the other, a 
connection is formed between the object of pity and the one who feels the 
emotion. That leads to a compassionate act of taking on the other’s 
suffering and acting to lessen it. A compassionate act is, therefore, an 
intersubjective act, “a social and aesthetic technology of belonging” to a 
community.3  
The contemporary philosopher Martha Nussbaum shows compassion 
to be “[t]he basic social emotion” and suggests ways to “produce it and 
remove obstacles to it.”4 She argues, as do a number of scholars,5 for 
incorporating the concept of compassion into economics, law, politics, 
educational and public institutions, in other words, for creating a 
“compassionate nation.”6 Dostoevsky’s view of pity is strikingly relevant 
to this project: it is not against science or law that he directs his argument; 
rather he perceives them as ineffective without a Christian foundation. 
Both Nussbaum and Dostoevsky posit pity as essential for social 
cohesion, however, what for Nussbaum is a secular concept, for 
Dostoevsky is inextricable from Christian faith. Thus if pity is necessary 
for social community and pity is inherently Christian, then social 
cohesion is impossible without Christianity.  
In Crime and Punishment, Raskolnikov’s oscillation between opening 
his heart to pity and fighting it, as well as between extending and 
receiving pity, serves as a dramatic representation of his spiritual path. 
The novel presents multiple manifestations of the conflict between 
compassion and rationality: internally—in Raskolnikov’s impulses 
underscored by his very name, and externally—in characters who either 
reflect various aspects of Raskolnikov’s character, or symbolize the moral 
choices that will determine his future. Raskolnikov’s actions, both before 
and after the murder, show an internal clash between compassion and 
rationality; they are marked by a “double movement,” as in Robert Louis 
                                                 
2 Oliver Davies, A Theology of Compassion. Metaphysics of Difference and the Renewal 
of Tradition (London: SCM Press, 2001), 18. 
3 Lauren Berlant, ed, “Introduction” to Compassion. The Culture and Politics of an 
Emotion (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), 5. 
4 Martha Nussbaum, “Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion,” Social Philosophy and 
Policy, 13: 1 (Winter 1996): 28. 
5 See Jonathan Miller, The Compassionate Community. Ten Values to Unite America 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Richard Reilly, Ethic of Compassion. Bridging 
Ethical Theory and Religious Moral Discourse (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008); 
Lauren Berlant, ed. Compassion. The Culture and Politics of an Emotion. 
6 Nussbaum, 58. 
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Jackson’s phrase: “a motion of sympathy and a motion of disgust, of 
attraction and recoil…”7 In his last novel, The Brothers Karamazov, 
Dostoevsky reformulates Christianity as active love, however, in Crime 
and Punishment he poses pity as the essence of Christianity. This is why 
by the end of the novel Raskolnikov’s achievement of Christian faith 
coincides with his willingness to extend and receive pity. 
In contemporary discourse, pity has acquired negative connotations of 
condescension, however, this is a relatively new development: of the 
post-Victorian era for European,8 and of the Soviet period for Russian, 
cultures.9 In different historical periods and in different languages, pity 
and compassion comprise pairs with variously defined relationship.10 In 
Russian culture, especially in pre-Revolutionary Russia, pity has been 
synonymous with compassion and has carried mostly positive 
connotations. It has often been perceived as synonymous with love: 
“zhalost’ was always understood as one of the supreme values, as a 
feeling close to love and not offensive at all.”11 Anna Wierzbicka, a 
linguist, explores the difference in the essence of the concept in different 
languages. “Unlike pity,” she writes, “ zhalost’ is, potentially, a feeling 
that can embrace all living creatures, just as love can.”12 She quotes 
Geoffrey Gorer’s studies of the Russian “national character” where he 
contrasts English pity and Russian zhalost’: “in contrast to pity, it is 
perhaps even more desirable to receive zhalost’ than to offer it. It can be, 
and often is, felt for all undergoing moral and spiritual anguish, whether 
personally known or not.”13 
From Aristotle and the Stoics forward, pity has provided an equally 
fertile ground for aesthetical, ethical, sociological, linguistic, and 
religious debates. The issue at the heart of any discussion of pity has been 
whether it involves reason or whether it is purely instinctive and therefore 
                                                 
7 Robert Louis Jackson, “Philosophical Pro and Contra in Part One of Crime and 
Punishment,” in Raskolnikov and Svidrigailov, ed. Harold Bloom (Broomball, PA: Chelsea 
House Publishers, 2004), 22. 
8 Nussbaum, 29. 
9 Irina B. Levontina, Anna A. Zalizniak, “Human Emotions Viewed Through the Russian 
Language,” in Emotions in Crosslinguistic Perspective, ed. Jean Harkins, Anna Wierzbicka 
(Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2001), 318. 
10 David Konstan, Pity Transformed (London: Duckworth, 2001), 13; Oliver Davies, A 
Theology of Compassion. Metaphysics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradition, 234; 
Nussbaum, 28. 
11 Levontina and Zalizniak, 319. 
12 Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics, Culture, and Cognition. Universal Human Concepts in 
Culture-Specific Configurations (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 168. 
13 Ibid., 169. 
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irrational. Philosophers searching for a stable system of morals have 
disagreed on whether pity has any moral value. Kant and Nietzsche 
argued, in contrast for instance to Rousseau and Schopenhauer, that pity 
is an irrational force that may do more harm than good.  
This argument touches upon the main intellectual concerns of the 
1840s and 60s. Philosophical theories from Rousseau to Kant, Hegel, and 
Schopenhauer formed a part of general philosophical education and were 
the building blocks of Russian intellectual culture.14 Critical opinions vary 
on the extent of Dostoevsky’s familiarity with Kant’s work; perhaps his 
knowledge of Kant was largely indirect;15 it is safe to assume nevertheless 
that Dostoevsky was keenly interested in the problem of moral law and its 
relation to reason and faith. Kant is the philosopher who most famously 
reinterpreted the relationship of morality and reason.  
In order to define a moral law that is truly universal and not 
undermined by subjectivity, Kant eliminates emotions from the list of 
acceptable motivations for human acts. The only truly moral acts are 
those motivated by duty, i.e. the moral law, the intrinsic sense of right and 
wrong we all possess. Kant allows for love, respect and gratitude to be 
considered as duties and therefore acceptable motives for moral acts, yet 
he denies the status of duty to compassion: 
In fact, when another suffers and, although I cannot help him, I let myself be 
infected by his pain (through my imagination), then two of us suffer, though the 
evil really (in nature) affects only one. But there cannot possibly be a duty to 
                                                 
14 Steven Cassedy writes: “One could certainly argue that German idealism was so much a 
part of the intellectual culture in which Dostoevsky passed his early adult years that no 
reading, writing, and thinking person could resist its lure” (137). “The Shape of Russian 
Idealism: from Kant and Hegel to Dostoevsky to Russian Religious Renaissance,” in Cold 
Fusion: Aspects of the German Cultural Presence in Russia, ed. Gennady Barabtarlo (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2000). 
15 The sources on the subject are rather limited. There are several articles exploring 
similarities and divergences in Dostoevsky’s and Kant’s views, i.e. Evgenia Cherkasova, 
“Kant on Free Will and Arbitrariness: a View from Dostoevsky’s Underground,” Philosophy 
and Literature 28: 2 (Oct., 2004); Susan McReynolds, "Aesthetics and Social Justice: The 
problem of Dostoevsky," Literary Imagination v 4: 1 (Winter 2002): 91-105; Alexander von 
Schonborn, “Church and State: Dostoevsky and Kant,” in Barabtarlo, ed. Cold Fusion, 126-
136. There is a multitude of sources in Russian, of which only one, and by far not the most 
useful, is routinely mentioned in English language criticism: Iakov Goloskover, Dostoevsky 
and Kant (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk, 1963). The assertion that Dostoevsky knew 
Kant’s philosophy rests on his familiarity with popular intellectual topics of the day and his 
request in 1854 for a copy of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Another possible link: in 1863, 
two years before starting work on Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky traveled to Turin with 
Apollinaria Suslova who, according to her dairy, was at the time reading “some philosophical 
treatise about Kant and Hegel.” Quoted  in David Magarshack, Dostoevsky (London: Secker 
& Warburg, 1962), 295. She would no doubt share her impressions with Dostoevsky.  
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increase the evil in the world and so to do good from compassion. This would be 
an insulting kind of beneficence, since it expresses the kind of benevolence one 
has toward someone unworthy, called pity; and this has no place in men’s 
relationship with one another, since they are not to make a display of their 
worthiness to be happy.16 
Kant here labels acts motivated by compassion, rather than by rational 
sense of duty, as insulting to the other and therefore immoral.  
Nietzsche, in his stand toward pity, found the only point of agreement 
with Kant’s philosophy, and one of the few points of disagreement with 
his “great teacher Schopenhauer.”17 Nietzsche cautions against “the great 
danger to mankind […] in the ever spreading morality of pity.” For him, 
pity is an illness of “the will turning against life.”18 At best, it serves the 
weak as “the means to endure the pressure of existence.”19 Having begun 
with the “problem of the value of pity and of morality of pity,” Nietzsche 
proceeds to question and reevaluate the very concept of morality.  
It is not in the least surprising that in Crime and Punishment we find 
so much resonance with Nietzsche’s rejection of Christianity. Without 
being aware of his works Dostoevsky argues with the worldview inherent 
in Nietzsche, one that he knew well from the works of some of 
Nietzsche’s predecessors20, and from the general intellectual climate of 
his time. The two thinkers were children of “their age, the children of 
unbelief and doubt”21 and were diagnosing the same crisis in European 
thought that was undermining the traditional foundations of morality. 
Both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche realize that morality is based on faith 
(here Nietzsche is in expressed disagreement with Kant) and both see the 
crisis of faith threatening the very foundation of society, yet, where 
Nietzsche rationalizes and welcomes the crisis by finding fault in the very 
                                                 
16 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), Second Part, § 34. 
17 Nietzsche also lists Plato, Spinoza, and La Rochefoucauld, among the philosophers 
united by “their low estimation of pity,” in Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann and RJ Holligdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 19.  
18 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 19. Emphasis in original. 
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, in Basic Writings of Nietzsche, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 397. 
20 Most significant in this respect is Max Stirner’s 1844 book The Ego and its Own. This 
German philosopher is one of the most important predecessors if not sources of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, and his book was widely known in Russia’s intellectual circles in the middle of 
nineteenth century. Kirpotin suggest that Stirner’s book is indirectly quoted in Crime and 
Punishment as the “one book” on account of which Raskolnikov writes his article (note 3, p. 
67-70). 
21 Dostoevsky’s letter to Natalia Fonvizina, Jan.-Feb., 1854.  
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premises of morality, Dostoevsky champions the Christian society and 
endeavours to prevent the collapse of Christianity.22  
Kant’s argument for rational bases of morality and his view of 
religious faith as a logical conclusion of moral law would be unacceptable 
to Dostoevsky. To Kant’s argument that moral judgments must be 
disinterested he provides a counterargument of Raskolnikov’s experience 
where the emotional involvement with another human being—inter-
subjective experience of compassion—produces moral behavior, while 
disinterested reasoning leads to isolation, moral degradation, and, in an 
extreme, to murder. To the Nietzschean view of pity as an integral part of 
the morality of the weak, Dostoevsky opposes the experiences of the 
novel’s weakest characters, the powerless and destitute Dunia 
Raskolnikov and Sonya Marmeladov, whose strength lies in their ability 
to bring out and to extend pity. 
The debate about pity opens early in the novel, in Raskolnikov’s 
conversation with Marmeladov in chapter two of Crime and Punishment. 
This scene, at the very beginning of the action, introduces Raskolnikov 
and the reader to a number of major characters and announces pity as the 
novel’s central theme. Two problematic characters, the pathetic Marme-
ladov and the ridiculous Lebeziatnikov, open the debate on pity in the 
way that will shape the rest of the novel. They are “entrusted” with 
establishing one of the most important philosophical oppositions of Crime 
and Punishment: rationalism versus Christianity, and it is not accidental 
that Lebeziatnikov (in Marmeladov’s rendering) reduces this opposition 
to that of science against compassion.    
In his speech, Marmeladov distinguishes between poverty(bednost’) 
and destitution (nishcheta), suffering (stradanie) and compassion (or co-
suffering—sostradanie), and finally, most importantly, pity (zhalost’) and 
justice (spravedlivost’). He begins by excusing his drinking on the 
grounds of his abject poverty and then introduces his neighbor 
Lebeziatnikov, and his daughter Sonya.  It soon becomes clear that Lebe-
ziatnikov represents views directly opposed to Marmeladov’s on the 
                                                 
22 Literature on the subject “Dostoevsky and Nietzsche” is quite enormous in Russia, 
Germany and everywhere else. Among representative articles in English see Janko Lavrin, “A 
Note on Nietzsche and Dostoevsky,” Russian Review 28, no. 2 (Apr., 1969); A.D. Hope, 
“Dostoevsky and Nietzsche,” Melbourne Slavonic Studies 4 (1970); Miroslav John Hanak, 
“Dostoevsky’s Metaphysics in the Light of Nietzsche’s Psychology,” New Zealand Slavonic 
Journal 9 (1972); René Girard, “Superman in the Underground: Strategies of Madness: 
Nietzsche, Wagner, and Dostoevsky,” Modern Language Notes 91 (1976); in German, Jordi 
Morillas, "Über das Verbrechen: Rasklonikows philosophische Lehre," Dostoevsky Studies 
XII (2008): 213-37. 
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issues central to his speech: pity and justice. The world Marmeladov 
describes is the world in its lowest depth; he has brought his family to 
utter destitution, yet there is one thing this man still considers his due—
pity.  His confession culminates with a passionate hymn to and a demand 
for pity, with its feverish pitch building from the beginning of his speech. 
“Has it ever happened to you,” he asks Raskolnikov, “to petition 
hopelessly for a loan?” He admits that there should not be any reason for 
a person to give him money knowing that he would never repay the loan.  
“From compassion?” he offers a possible reason. “But Mr. Lebeziatnikov 
who keeps up with modern ideas explained the other day that compassion 
is forbidden nowadays by science itself (sostradanie v nashe vremia 
dazhe naukoi vospreshcheno), and that that’s what is done now in 
England where they have a political economy” (12).23 V. Kirpotin ob-
serves that Marmeladov uses Lebeziatnikov as a point of reference and 
his “confession is, from beginning to end, as if ‘punctuated’ by 
Lebeziatnikov” (14). Indeed, Lebeziatnikov, marginal and ridiculous as 
he may be, is an important character because he represents, here and 
throughout the novel, the same ideas that torture Raskolnikov’s mind.  
Marmeladov ends his heartbreaking tale by asking its central 
question: “Who will have pity on a man like me, eh? Do you pity me sir 
or not? Tell me, sir, do you pity me or not? He-he-he.” This question is 
repeated several times by Marmeladov, by the tavern owner, by 
Marmeladov again; the word pity resounds in several grammatical 
forms—noun, verb, adverb—(this effect is often lost in translation) until 
it is absolutely clear that this is what the whole confession was about.  
“To be pitied? Why am I to be pitied?” Marmeladov suddenly declaimed, 
standing up with his arms outstretched, as though he had been only 
waiting for this question. “Why am I to be pitied, you say? Yes, there is 
nothing to pity me for! I ought to be crucified, crucified on a cross, and 
not pitied! Crucify me, oh judge, crucify me, and having crucified, pity 
me.” Marmeladov here summons the image of Christ, and thus evokes the 
opposition between justice and pity. Christ’s pity that led him to suffering 
and death had nothing to do with matters of retribution and justice, and 
here lies the crux of the matter. Pity and justice belong to different 
systems of thought: pity is not arrived at through the logic that is the basis 
of earthly justice. Justice based on logic and accountability belongs on 
                                                 
23 Fedor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, trans. Ernest J. Simmons (New York: The 
Modern Library, 1950). I consistently modify this translation where the Russian word pity and 
its derivatives are translated with other synonymic expressions, i.e., “to take pity on someone” 
is often translated as “to feel for someone.” In such cases I restore the original wording.  
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earth, pity belongs with Christ. “He will pity us Who has had pity on all 
men, Who has understood all men and all things, He is the One, and He is 
the judge” (21).  
Marmeladov’s tale not only introduces pity as a topic but also forces 
Raskolnikov and the reader to experience it. Here, as throughout the 
novel, Dostoevsky uses pity as a powerful tool for involving the reader in 
the argument about its value. As he vividly describes a succession of 
scenes of poverty, sickness, and despair, he compels the reader to feel 
compassion for the suffering characters. The reader thus becomes 
emotionally connected with the objects of his compassion and deeply 
involved in the story and in its arguments. Deborah Martinsen describes a 
similar effect of exposing the reader of Crime and Punishment to scenes 
of shame: Dostoevsky “collaps[es] the intersubjective distance between 
characters and readers by having us witness scenes of shame.”24 Unlike 
shame, however, pity has a long service record of eliminating the distance 
between the characters and the audience: in the Aristotelian formula25, 
together with fear, pity is the aesthetic instrument of tragedy, and is 
crucial in bringing the audience to cathartic experience. By making the 
reader feel pity, Dostoevsky collapses the distance between the text and 
the reader just as the distance between Raskolnikov and Marmeladov is 
collapsed when Raskolnikov feels and acts on pity for Marmeladov’s 
family.    
Raskolnikov’s reaction to Marmeladov’s story of “painful (boleznen-
naia) love” for his family, is similarly painful: “[he] listened intently but 
with a painful sensation” (s oshchushcheniem boleznennym) (19). Raskol-
nikov opens himself to the distress of the other, which is the essence of 
compassion. At the same time, the reader also becomes an observer on par 
with Raskolnikov, and like him, experiences pity. This experience 
consists of specific elements of seeing, being moved by, and acting to 
lessen another’s distress. Raskolnikov’s (and the reader’s) senses are 
affected twice and therefore with doubled force: having listened to 
Marmeladov’s tale, he takes him home and actually sees his wife Katerina 
Ivanovna, the abject poverty of her quarters, and the sick and hungry 
children. Raskolnikov reacts by impulsively digging into his pocket for 
his last pieces of change and leaving them, anonymously, on the 
windowsill. He thus follows through all the elements of compassion from 
cognition of suffering to the volitional act of remedying it.  
                                                 
24 Deborah Martinsen, Surprised by Shame : Dostoevsky’s Liars and Narrative Exposure 
(Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2003), xiii.  
25 Aristotle, The Poetics, trans. James Hutton (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1982) 
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The reader has no such possibility for action and is left with the 
painful sensation he has experienced throughout the chapter. Thus when 
at the very next moment Raskolnikov “comes to his senses” and wants to 
go back and retrieve his money, he is arguing not only with himself—
“What a stupid thing I’ve done…”—but with the reader as well. The 
reader who is not yet privy to Raskolnikov’s plans and theories, sees his 
impulsive act of helping the suffering other as a natural reaction. The 
sudden reversal on Raskolnikov’s part invites the reader to question his 
own impulses as well. In this instance the reader becomes a participant in 
the argument about the value of pity.  
All Raskolnikov’s charitable acts follow the same structure as 
Marmeladov’s episode of the oscillation between impulsive compass-
sionate act and rational questioning of this act. When he sees a drunk and 
disoriented girl on the street, he reacts impulsively and immediately: he 
enlists the help of a policeman who shows “sincere compassion” and he 
once again gives all of his money. And then the moment of compassion 
ends, and that of rational thinking begins: “At that moment something 
seemed to sting Raskolnikov; in an instant a complete revulsion of feeling 
came over him.” He refutes his own actions with scientific and logical 
explanation: “But what does it matter? That’s as it should be, they tell us. 
A certain percentage, they tell us, must every year go…that way…to the 
devil, I suppose, so that the rest may remain chaste, and not be interfered 
with.”26  
Raskolnikov feels uneasy about his compassionate acts because he 
knows, albeit subconsciously, the importance of pity in healthy society, 
which for Dostoevsky is synonymous with Christian society. Raskol-
nikov’s crime and its motives place him outside and above society, but a 
compassionate act is an intersubjective activity that pulls him back to 
being a member of community. When after the murder Raskolnikov 
throws away money given to him out of pity—a random blow by a whip 
from a passing coach made passersby feel sorry for him (ikh 
razzhalobil)t—his marks the moment when he “cut himself from every-
one and everything” (105). The scene in which Raskolnikov refuses to be 
the object of charity illustrates what Nussbaum describes as the social 
function of pity. Nussbaum argues that compassion (which she, like 
Dostoevsky, uses synonymously with pity) is a basic social emotion and 
                                                 
26 See for instance Harriet Murav’s analysis of this scene in her Holy Foolishness: 
Dostoevsky’s Novels and the Poetics of Cultural Critique (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1992), 55-
59. See also Liza Knapp, The Annihilation of Inertia. Dostoevsky and Metaphysics (Evanston, 
IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 50-51. 
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“a central bridge between the individual and the community” as “it brings 
human beings together through the thought of their common weaknesses 
and risks.”27 When Raskolnikov feels pity, and when a stranger feels pity 
toward him, his and the stranger’s act of charity include him in the greater 
community of human beings, the community united by a common 
perception of good and evil and a common ability to be affected by 
other’s distress. Moreover, compassion involves the realization that 
societal well-being is based on individual well-being.  
Nussbaum’s ideas about the role of pity in society correspond 
remarkably with Raskolnikov’s rejection of pity as a way to sever his ties 
with society. However, for Dostoevsky pity is not a secular concept, but 
rather the essence of Christianity. Thus if social cohesion is impossible 
without pity, then it is impossible without Christianity. One of 
Dostoevsky’s objectives in Crime and Punishment is to show the 
limitations of secular pity and the impossibility of secular morality. To 
that end, he shows how an attempt to eliminate religion from the 
foundation of society leads to moral degradation. Raskolnikov’s struggle 
against his god-given ability to be compassionate leads him to an attempt 
to break with the society afflicted by suffering and to become instead 
someone who is too far above the masses to be ruled by their laws or 
affected by their pain.  
Since for Dostoevsky, faith is the prerequisite for moral living, it is 
not enough for Raskolnikov’s spiritual survival to accept the Kantian 
postulate that “not all things are lawful;” he must also accept that only his 
personal faith in God can provide this certainty. Some scholars consider 
Dostoevsky’s theology ethical, that is, Kantian in the sense that like Kant 
Dostoevsky “reasons from the meaningfulness of his moral obligation to 
his belief in immortality.”28 Most, however, agree that Dostoevsky saw 
faith as the source of morality. James Scanlan argues that Dostoevsky saw 
the origins of the innate sense of right and wrong to be “a ‘gift’ of the 
Creator in the sense of an initial structural endowment.”29 The theologian 
L. Zander also presents Dostoevsky’s views as directly opposed to Kant’s 
autonomous ethics, because for him “morality is impossible without 
religion.”30 Indeed, Raskolnikov’s case is a caution against god-less 
                                                 
27 Nussbaum, 28, 44. 
28 R. Maurice Barineau, “The Triumph of Ethics over Doubt: Dostoevsky’s Brothers 
Karamazov.” Christianity and Literature, 43: 3-4 (1994): 376. 
29 James Scanlan, Dostoevsky the Thinker (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2002), 88. 
30 L. A. Zander  Dostoevsky (London: SCM Press, 1948), 32. 
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compassion: his initial sharing in the pain of others—his family, 
Marmeladov’s family, and the whole world of poverty around him—leads 
to a protest, to a demand for immediate changes. But since he rejects God 
and the religious interpretation of suffering and compassion, there is 
nothing to stop Raskolnikov from attempting to become a god—call him 
Napoleon or Mohammed—with the power to decide the worth and fate of 
other people. Compassion without faith leads Raskolnikov to murder. 
Other characters’ actions in the novel are likewise defined by their 
relationship with the problem of pity. Luzhin, Svidrigailov, and, most 
important, Sonya, are characterized by their ability or inability to share in 
the pain of others. Luzhin is not a complex individual: he is a greedy, 
calculating, and unequivocally negative character. His role is to pervert 
every idea and feeling he comes in contact with, including love and 
compassion. His chooses Dunya as his bride without any feelings for her; 
and he performs an ostensibly charitable act of giving Sonya money not 
because he sympathizes with her plight. His goal is to discredit Sonya and 
through her Raskolnikov; for this reason he sets up a scene in which he 
hands Sonya a ten ruble banknote while slipping a hundred ruble note in 
her pocket and planning to expose “the theft” later.  As he proffers his 
money, he can’t resist lecturing Sonya and flattering himself on his good 
deed: “so then from the feeling of humanity and so to speak compassion I 
should be glad to be of service…” (336). This “so to speak compassion” 
speaks volumes about Luzhin. Even if it were not followed by the ugly 
scene of “unmasking” Sonya as a thief, this perversion of Christian 
compassion and charity serves to condemn him.  
When Luzhin delivers his argument against loving one’s neighbor— 
“what came of it? […] It came to my tearing my coat in half to share with 
my neighbor and we both were half naked”—he not only perverts an 
important biblical image but also closely follows Kant’s logic: according 
to Kant, the acting out of compassion leaves not one but two men half 
naked, and that increases evil in the word. Luzhin (and Dostoevsky) 
extend Kant’s argument to include the proposition that pity breeds evil; 
acts motivated by compassion are not moral; and charity is not a personal 
responsibility. Dostoevsky undercuts this logic by making its proponent 
into a caricature of a man, but he is well aware of the dangerous allure of 
these theories when they are delivered in subtler, more sophisticated 
forms.  
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Svidrigailov, Raskolnikov’s double,31 is a much more complex 
character. At a crucial point in his life, during his last meeting with 
Dunia, he allows himself to feel and act on pity, but then hardens his heart 
against the feeling and thus refuses the chance of redemption. 
Svidrigailov thus proves to be Raskolnikov’s double in a most important 
way: they both oscillate between acting on pity and cynically rejecting it. 
At the meeting, he attempts desperately to win the affection of Dunya, 
because he sees her love as his last chance of redeeming himself and 
starting a new life. He is ready to use force and comes very close to doing 
just that, but stops at the last moment and allows Dunya to leave. This 
same night he commits suicide.32 The sole reason why Dunya escapes 
Svidrigailov is his pity for her: later that night “he recalled how in that 
instant he felt something like pity for her (tochno pozhalel eyo), how he 
felt a pang in his heart… (kak by serdtse sdavilo emu)” (454) He 
immediately stops his own thoughts: “damnation, these thoughts again! I 
must put it away,” and so in resisting the curative effect of pity he refuses 
the cathartic experience and follows the alternative path to the suicide. 
Thus Dunya is saved by Svidrigailov’s pity even if it does not save him.33 
Why is Svidrigailov denied and Raskolnikov given a chance of 
redemption? Perhaps, as Boyce Gibson assets, the difference between 
them is “that Svidrigailov has traveled much further along the same 
path.”34 He is older and more cynical than Raskolnikov; with a much 
darker past; moreover, his story is necessary to serve as the alternative to 
                                                 
31 Edward Wasiolek adheres to the common view of Svidrigailov as Raskolnikov’s 
double: “Sonya represents the choice for good and Svidrigailov for evil,” “On the Structure of 
Crime and Punishment,” PMLA 74, no. 1 (Mar., 1959). Maurice Bebe comments that 
“Svidrigailov not only stands for the sensualist in Raskolnikov but also represents the outer-
directed form of the sensuality which in Raskolnikov is primarily inner-directed,” Maurice 
Bebe, “The Three Motives of Raskolnikov: A Reinterpretation of Crime and Punishment,” 
College English 17: 3 (Dec., 1955). 155); Tatiana Kasatkina, on the other hand, opposes the 
generally accepted view of Svidrigailov as Raskolnikov’s double: “we have here in fact two 
parallel stories […] completely opposite stories…” (Tatiana Kasatkina, “Voskreshenie 
Lazaria: opyt ekzegeticheskogo prochteniia romana F. M. Dostoevskogo ‘Prestuplenie i 
nakazanie,’” Voprosy Literatury 1 (2003). Harold Bloom posits Svidrigailov as 
“Raskolnikov’s patient nemesis” and the more fascinating of the two characters. Raskolnikov 
and Svidrigailov, ed. Harold Bloom (Broomball, PA: Chelsea House Publishers, 2004) 
32 On Svidrigailov and suicide, see Nikolai Nasedkin, Samoubiystvo Dostoevskogo. Tema 
suitsida v zhizni i tvorchestve pisatelia (Moscow: Algoritm, 2002), 213-229. 
33 Henry Russell analyses this scene in terms of a clash between purity and cynicism. This 
is a plausible interpretation although not explicitly supported by the text.  See Henry M. W. 
Russell, “Beyond the Will: Humiliation as Christian Necessity in Crime and Punishment,” in 
Dostoevsky and the Christian Tradition, ed. George Pattison and Diane Oenning Thompson 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 321. 
34 A. Boyce Gibson, The Religion of Dostoevsky (London: SCM Press, 1973), 97. 
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Raskolnikov’s. However, Raskolnikov’s, the unrepentant double 
murderer’s salvation in the epilogue displays less psychological 
motivation than Svidrigailov’s suicide. There is a break between the 
psychological authenticity of the novel and the lack of motivation of the 
events in the epilogue. Raskolnikov’s transformation into a believer is not 
explained; in fact, Zander maintains, it should not and could not be 
explained because Raskolnikov is saved by a miracle. Zander points out 
that the description of Raskolnikov’s conversion emphasizes the 
unknowable nature of the forces that suddenly seize him: “Dostoevsky 
describes in them a true miracle—the immediate action of divine grace, 
the visitation of the human soul by the Holy Spirit.”35 Logic is 
inadmissible to the story of grace entering one’s soul, because Law and 
Grace belong, like justice and pity, to different planes.36  
The miracle of the epilogue is akin to mercy entering the legal 
process in the form of executive pardon,37 which is exactly what 
Dostoevsky gives Raskolnikov at the end. As in Marmeladov’s formula, 
Raskolnikov is crucified and then/nevertheless pitied.  Like a 
compassionate God of the universe of his own creation, Dostoevsky saves 
his character from moral death for no other reason than compassion. As 
an author constructing a narrative, Dostoevsky emphasizes the 
miraculous, divine nature of mercy by withdrawing a realistic motivation 
for Raskolnikov’s conversion.     
At the end of the novel, Raskolnikov learns to extend and to receive 
pity and is granted a new life. The miracle of his salvation occurs 
simultaneously with his realization of his love for Sonya, the human 
personification of compassion in the novel. Throughout the novel Sonya 
Marmeladov guides him toward this acceptance; this is her main function 
in the novel. Otherwise her character is remarkably underdeveloped: she 
has no inner voice38, and is to a large extent a symbol rather than a real 
character, “a symbol of intuitive wisdom and boundless faith.”39 Sonya’s 
name, Sophia, denotes divine wisdom40, although in the novel this 
                                                 
35 Zander, 18. 
36 See a related argument on the role of mercy in law and legal justice in Ivan Esaulov, 
“The Categories of Law and Grace in Dostoevsky’s Poetics,” in Dostoevsky and the Christian 
Tradition. 
37 “Pardoning, or clemency, is exclusively in the domain of the executive, rather than the 
judiciary branch of government,” Konstan, 34. 
38 Gary Rosenshield, Crime and Punishment: The Techniques of the Omniscient Author 
(Lisse: The Peter de Ridder Press, 1978), 30. 
39 Ibid., 30 
40 See George Gibian, “Traditional Symbolism in Crime and Punishment,” PMLA 70 
(December 1955), 979-996. 
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wisdom manifests itself only in Sonya’s infinite power for compassion. 
When we actually hear Sonya speak during Raskolnikov’s two visits she 
speaks only of pity and faith, and her face expresses “a sort of insatiable 
compassion (nenasytimoe sostradanie).” This is a striking phrase and 
Dostoevsky draws the reader’s attention to it by the italics and by 
following it with “if one may so express it” (287), as if asking us to 
ponder the meaning of the phrase.  
The power of Sonya lies, paradoxically, in her weakness, in her 
limitations, and in her status as a victim. They produce the feelings in 
Raskolnikov that Friedrich Nietzsche would soon call, with derision, “the 
‘unegotistic’ instincts of pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice…”41 It is by 
both evoking and extending pity that Sonya brings Raskolnikov back to 
humanity. When she describes a heart-wrenching scene with Katerina 
Ivanovna: “what a pitiful sight it was!” (tak zhalko bylo smotret’), she 
answers Raskolnikov’s skepticism with ‘And don’t you pity her? (A vam 
razve ne zhalko) Don’t you pity? […] You gave your last kopek yourself’ 
(288). Pity is her reaction to Raskolnikov’s confession as well: ‘What 
have you done—what have you done to yourself! […] There is no one—
no one in the world now so unhappy as you’ (370)42. Dostoevsky defines 
Sonya’s feelings at the moment as “passionate, agonizing sympathy 
(sochuvstvie) for the unhappy man” (371). Her compassion affects 
Raskolnikov: “a feeling long unfamiliar flooded his heart and softened it 
at once. He did not struggle against it” (370). This unnamed feeling might 
be what Marmeladov expects to feel in answer to his demand for pity; and 
it is Raskolnikov’s chance to start on the long road back to God. In 
accepting compassion he makes a step toward becoming part of human 
society again, the society that for Dostoevsky is necessarily Christian, just 
as his earlier refusal of charity symbolized his break with it.  
Nietzsche believed pity to be an affliction, and defined all religion as 
preaching pity and with it self-contempt.43 He famously defined 
Christianity as “active pity for all the failures and all the weak.” Kant, 
too, believed that the position of an object of pity is humiliating, “since it 
expresses the kind of benevolence one has toward someone unworthy, 
called pity; and this has no place in men’s relationship with one 
                                                 
41 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, 19. 
42 In Sonya’s reaction we find an echo of Dostoevsky’s earlier observation in The Notes 
form the House of the Dead about Russian perception of crime as misfortune: “the whole of 
the Russian people in all of Russia calls crime a misfortune, and the criminal an unfortunate 
wretch.”  
43 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 340 
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another.”44 Raskolnikov and Sonya’s relationship refutes this dynamic: 
she herself is the giver and the object of a great deal of compassion in the 
novel, yet compassion is her very strength, and the instrument with which 
she pushes Raskolnikov on to the road to redemption.  
Sonya’s character also refutes Nietzsche’s views of compassion as a 
relationship between the strong and the weak. Nietzsche views pity as the 
instrument of control both for the strong and for the weak. The strong 
exercise control when they extend benefits to sufferers; and the weak 
infect others with their pain, thereby retaining at least one power, the 
power to hurt others. From such a point of view, everyone loses when pity 
is involved. Dostoevsky, however, presents a very different picture: in it, 
the weak Sonya does indeed exercise power over Raskolnikov by making 
him feel pity, act on it for others and at long last accept it for himself, and 
this leads to good. Dunya arouses pity in Svidrigailov and is saved from 
rape. Both Sonya and Dunya are classic representatives of the weak—
they are poor, powerless women, and indeed their only power proves to 
be the power to elicit pity. And by this power they save, or attempt to, as 
in the case of Svidrigailov, themselves and others, rather than hurt them.   
Dostoevsky’s last novel, The Brothers Karamazov, advances a very 
specific formula of Christianity as active love (opyt deiatel’noi liubvi, in 
Zosima’s words). There seems to be a progression in Dostoevsky’s major 
novels from the exploration of pity’s potential to symbolize Christianity 
in Crime and Punishment to posing love as the essence of true belief in 
his last novel.45 This shift might be explained by the differences in the 
nature of compassion and love. In Christianity this difference is not 
immediately apparent. The contemporary philosopher Khen Lampert 
observes “complete overlap between the concept of love and compassion 
in Christianity” and interprets the New Testament understanding of love 
as compassion: “Love is the perception of another’s distress and action to 
assist that person: in other words, love is compassion.”46 However, he 
                                                 
44 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 250. For a comprehensive analysis of similarities in 
Kant and Nietzsche’s views see David E. Cartwright, “Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on 
the Morals of Pity,” Journal of the History of Ideas 45: 1 (Jan.—Mar., 1984). 
45 This progression also includes Notes from the House of the Dead and The Idiot. In the 
Notes, Dostoevsky repeatedly stresses the Russian folk’s capacity for compassion and 
forgiveness. For an analysis of Myshkin as compassion see chapter Four in Gibson, The 
Religion of Dostoevsky: “He [Myshkin] is compassion: he is drawn inevitably to the greater 
weakness and the greater need” (115) and “the version of Christianity which Myshkin 
represents, and which Dostoevsky does not disdain, commands a disproportionate concern 
with the afflicted…” (118). 
46 Khen Lampert, Traditions of Compassion. From Religious Duty to Social Activism 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 20. 
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points out that “the concept of Christian love is broader than the concept 
of compassion,”47 i.e. love might be joyful and unrelated to the moments 
of distress. It is, in other words, more inclusive. Moreover, the complex 
nature of compassion as a succession of cognitive, affective, and 
volitional elements implies a possibility that the sequence can be left 
incomplete, that a person might stop at the affective stage and refrain 
from the act of help. In another extreme, the emotional response could be 
so strong that the person is moved to anger, as Ivan Karamazov is, and 
revenge rather than compassionate act. This volatile aspect of pity is 
absent from the concept of Christian love. That makes love easier to 
postulate but harder to dramatize in a novel: unlike pity love doesn’t have 
an identifiable pattern of the emotion and the accompanying action.48  
In Crime and Punishment, Dostoevsky, like Nietzsche, presents 
Christianity as active pity. Pity’s function in the novel is not, as Kant 
assumed, to multiply suffering in the world, but rather to ease the burden 
of suffering by first sharing it, and then working to relieve it. When Sonya 
tells Raskolnikov that he must “suffer and expiate his sin by it” she means 
accepting responsibility for his crime, without which his redemption is 
impossible. Yet when Mikolka the young old believer (raskolnik) 
confesses to Raskolnikov’s crime in order to voluntarily accept suffering 
and thus purify himself, the gesture is immediately refuted. The brilliant 
detective Porfiry is very much aware of the religious sources of this 
confession, and disregards Mikolka’s admission of guilt. He muses almost 
sarcastically on the appeal of the concept, on “the force of the word 
‘suffering’ (postradat’),” and on the “need to suffer” (postradat’ nado). 
Had Sonya met with the unfortunate Mikolka, she would surely have told 
him that rather than bring more undeserved suffering into the world, he 
should co-suffer, that is, feel compassion for those who are already in 
need of help: ne postradat’, a sostradat’ would be the gist of her 
argument as well as Dostoevsky’s.  
                                                 
47 Ibid., 22. 
48 Pity and a character’s relationship with it plays an important role in the plot of The 
Brothers Karamazov. One important scene is Alyosha’s visit to Grushenka at the moment 
when his faith is assaulted by doubt after the elder Zosima’s death. When Grushenka realizes 
this, she jumps off his lap and cancels her plan to seduce him. Alyosha, recognizing 
Grushenka’s“ loving soul,” is moved to tears, grateful for her compassion:  “she spared 
(poshchadila) me just now” (351). Grushenka, in turn, is moved by Alyosha’s willingness to 
see the best in her. She interprets Alyosha’s gift to her as pity: “I don’t know, I don’t know 
what he told me, my heart heard it, he wrung my heart…He is the first to pity me (pozhalel on 
menia) and the only one, that’s what.” (357). In the middle of this scene comes the parable of 
an onion, the story of mercy and compassion. 
